Chain of Command is a commanding read

New York Times and New Yorker columnist Seymour Hersh's new book, Chain of Command, provides an eye-opening look at the inner workings of the executive branch after 9/11 and shows the disturbing reality of the United States' Middle East policy. Hersh's insight into the military, White House, FBI, CIA, NSA and State, Defense, Homeland Security and Justice Departments depicts a side of government that is only loosely bound by reason and by law.

Hersh was one of the first journalists to break the Abu Ghraib scandal, and in a series of articles in The New Yorker, Hersh uncovered a Special Access Program (a SAP or "black" program) that permitted more extreme interrogation methods to be used on high value targets. The first section of the book discusses the SAP and other interrogation failures in Guantanamo, Afghanistan and Iraq. It is an amazing piece of journalism, not only due to its remarkable sources and reporting, but also because of Hersh's clear narrative style.

The fact that Hersh could get not just one but multiple sources to reveal the existence of a top-secret black program about which only a handful of people in the administration had been fully briefed is an astonishing journalistic feat; even Congress didn't have a clue. But Hersh also deserves equal praise for his masterful organization and the clarity of his writing.

Instead of stating a thesis at the beginning of the book, Hersh presents his material in a linear and rarely editorialized manner, although the reader is quickly convinced of the administration's mishandling of the country. He discusses problems at Guantanamo and in Afghanistan, the FBI and CIA failures that led up to these problems and the creation of an SAP that was eventually expanded to the civilian prisons in Iraq. Hersh's writing reads like an espionage thriller; it is especially horrifying due to its shocking truth.

Hersh also shows both the inefficiency and dissent within the NSA and the Department of Defense regarding the gathering and processing of intelligence. Both political parties have admitted that, at the time of 9/11, the U.S.'s intelligence network was in disarray, but Hersh gives specific examples of pre- and post-9/11 bureaucratic apathy and self-deception, such as the administration's selectively factual case for war. He also explains the frightening legal ramifications of the additional freedoms given to the executive branch by the SAP and the Patriot Act, including White House documents that show an effort to get around the Geneva Conventions and to narrowly redefine torture.

The book goes in depth, with equally thorough reporting, on the general war in Afghanistan, the decision to go to Iraq, deceptions among members of the administration, the threat in Pakistan and the modern state of the Middle East. But the Abu Ghraib story is Hersh's story, and he tells it with more insight and cohesion than anyone else. For that reason alone, this book is an essential read for anyone with an interest in history, peace and justice. Although the book is extremely critical of the Bush administration, it cites failures in the Clinton administration and presents arguments in such a way that readers from both political parties should take heed.